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Abstract  
Theoretical frameworks of anxiety propose that attentional biases to threat-related stimuli 
cause or maintain anxious states. The current paper draws on theoretical frameworks and key 
empirical studies to outline the distinctive attentional processes highlighted as being 
important in understanding anxiety. We develop a conceptual framework to make a 
distinction between two attentional biases: selective attention to threat and hypervigilance for 
threat. We suggest that these biases each have a different purpose and can account for the 
typical patterns of facilitated and impaired attention evident in anxious individuals. The 
framework is novel in its specification of the eye movement behavior associated with these 
attentional biases. We highlight that selective attention involves narrowing overt attention 
onto threat to ensure that these stimuli receive processing priority, leading to rapid 
engagement with task-relevant threat and delayed disengagement from task-irrelevant threat. 
We show that hypervigilance operates in the presence and absence of threat and involves 
monitoring for potential dangers via attentional broadening or excessive scanning of the 
environment with numerous eye movements, leading to improved threat detection and 
increased distraction from task-irrelevant threat. We conclude that future research could 
usefully employ eye movement measures to more clearly understand the diverse roles of 
attention in anxiety.   
 
Keywords: anxiety, eye movements, threat, selective attention, hypervigilance  
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Exploring the Function of Selective Attention and Hypervigilance for Threat in Anxiety 
 
In a recent meta-analysis, Armstrong and Olatunji (2012) reviewed free viewing and visual 
search eye movement paradigms in attention and anxiety. They argued that the findings of 
this research are consistent with theoretical models that highlight increased vigilance for 
threatening stimuli in individuals with elevated or clinical levels of anxiety. They further 
suggested that this attentional system is capacity limited and is most evident in studies that 
include paradigms with a limited range of eccentricity and with a low perceptual load. In 
addition, they highlighted that support for the theoretical proposition that increased anxiety is 
linked to difficulties disengaging from threat is only evident in certain viewing contexts.  
The current paper extends the basic arguments made in this meta-analysis to explore 
how eye movement paradigms can be used to test theoretical propositions linked to 
hypervigilance in anxiety, in addition to those that focus on selective attention. It highlights 
the distinct role of anxiety-related hypervigilance for threat by drawing on theoretical models 
of attention and anxiety and empirical findings that have used eye movement, neuroimaging 
and behavioral measures. We present a novel theoretical framework supported by findings 
from key empirical papers which demonstrates that selective attention and hypervigilance for 
threat are separable processes in anxiety. Moreover, we show how these different processes 
can be distinguished by their evolutionary function, their underlying mechanisms, the 
environmental or experimental conditions in which they occur, and the patterns of facilitated 
and impaired attention they generate, as shown in eye movement behaviors.  
Selective Attention to Threat 
The most consistent prediction to emerge from theoretical accounts of anxiety and 
attention is that there is a selective attentional bias to threat in anxiety, where individuals with 
high (vs. low) levels of anxiety selectively narrow attention onto threat stimuli in preference 
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to neutral stimuli. Theoretical accounts typically consider the possibility that this selective 
attentional bias consists of vigilance for threat (also referred to as rapid orienting and 
engagement of attention with threat) or attention maintenance on threat (also referred to as 
delayed disengagement from threat).  
The Orienting Network 
Armstrong and Olatunji (2012) proposed that the orienting network outlined by 
Posner and colleagues (e.g., Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005; Posner, 
2012; Posner & Rothbart, 2007) provides an effective framework with which to understand 
selective attentional processes. In humans, the cognitive system has a limited capacity to 
process all available sensory information and it needs to be able to select relevant stimuli for 
further processing (Hutton, 2008), especially if the stimuli are relevant to survival (Dolan & 
Vuilleumier, 2003). The orienting network is involved in selectively allocating attention to 
relevant objects/locations in order to enhance perceptual processing in these regions of the 
visual field (e.g., Fan et al., 2005; Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner & 
Rothbart, 2007; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005).  Orienting includes aligning attention 
with sensory stimuli by disengaging attention from the current location, shifting attention to 
and engaging it at a new location (Posner & Petersen, 1990). The purpose of orienting visual 
attention to a new stimulus or location is to change the distribution of processing resources 
across the visual field; that is, processing priority is reassigned as demonstrated by increased 
neural activity and processing speed in response to stimuli within the newly attended region 
(see Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000; Raz & Buhle, 2006).  Furthermore, selectively orienting 
attention to a relevant stimulus reduces the neural interference and competition for processing 
resources from task-irrelevant stimuli that fall outside the attended region (see Kastner & 
Ungerleider, 2000; Raz & Buhle, 2006). The brain regions underlying the orienting process 
have been described extensively and consist of fronto-parietal networks including the 
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superior parietal lobe, temporoparietal junction, superior colliculus, and frontal eye fields 
(Posner, 2012; Posner & Peterson, 1990; Raz & Buhle, 2006). 
The process of orienting can occur overtly or covertly (Moore, Armstrong & Fallah, 
2003; Posner, 2012). Overt orienting involves moving attention to a location by moving the 
eyes such that there is an alignment between the direction of gaze and the direction of 
attention (Moore, et al., 2003; Posner, 2012).  Due to the physiological constraints of the 
oculomotor system, the selection of visual information in a cognitive visual task is typically 
accomplished by overtly orienting the eyes to appropriate locations in the visual field 
(Liversedge & Findlay, 2000). Visual acuity declines systematically as retinal eccentricity 
increases with the fovea, parafovea and periphery corresponding (approximately) to 
eccentricities of less than 1°, 1-5° and greater than 5°, respectively (Findlay & Gilchrist, 
2003). Eye movements (saccades) are required to align the high acuity area of the retina (i.e., 
the fovea) with potential objects of interest to allow a detailed inspection during fixation 
(Liversedge & Findlay, 2000). Peripheral vision guides eye movements by providing 
information about the nature and location of potential objects of interest (Findlay & Gilchrist, 
2003; Hutton, 2008; Liversedge & Findlay, 2000).   
Covert orienting involves moving attention to a location without moving the eyes, 
such that the direction of attention is disengaged from the direction of gaze (Moore, et al., 
2003; Posner, 2012). Covert and overt orienting are typically regarded as closely related 
processes (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; Hutton, 2008; 
Rizzolatti, Riggio, & Sheliga, 1994). For example, it has been suggested that covert attention 
guides subsequent eye movements by providing a preview of potential objects or locations of 
interest that require more detailed foveal processing (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003). Moreover, 
Hoffman and Subramaniam (1995) concluded that there was an obligatory link between overt 
and covert attention based on the finding that participants were unable to simultaneously 
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execute an eye movement to one location and orient attention to a different location. One 
account for the close relationship between covert and overt attention was provided in the 
premotor theory of attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1994). This theory suggests that the preparation 
of an eye movement is responsible for covert shifts in visual attention and that the same 
neural circuitry underlies both overt and covert orienting. This theory is supported by fMRI 
data demonstrating considerable overlap in the brain regions recruited during overt and covert 
visual orienting (Corbetta et al., 1998; de Haan, Morgan & Rorden, 2008). For example, de 
Haan et al. (2008) found that a common fronto-parietal network was activated during overt 
and covert shifts of attention, which included bilateral activation in brain regions linked to the 
orienting network such as the frontal eye fields and the superior parietal lobes.  
Overt or covert orienting and selection can be guided by stimulus-driven processes 
and/or goal-directed processes. Stimulus-driven processes involve the exogenous capture of 
attention by stimulus properties (Yantis, 1993). Throughout the review, we use the terms 
‘stimulus-driven’ and ‘exogenous’ to indicate that the event triggering attentional selection is 
external to the individual and can conflict with task demands. Goal-directed processes 
involve the selection of information based on endogenous goals, beliefs and expectations 
(Yantis, 1993). We use the terms ‘goal-directed’ and ‘endogenous’ to indicate an internal 
event within the individual that triggers attentional selection on the basis of task demands. 
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) suggested that there were two fronto-parietal networks that 
controlled stimulus-driven and goal-directed visual attention. They suggested that the ventral 
fronto-parietal network is a stimulus-driven attentional system that is recruited when relevant, 
salient and previously unattended sensory events are detected. In contrast, the dorsal fronto-
parietal network was proposed to be the goal-directed attentional system that was responsible 
for the endogenous selection of stimuli and responses. Corbetta and Shulman (2002) 
proposed that the two attentional systems interact such that the ventral network is able to 
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interrupt the goal-directed functioning of the dorsal network in order to reorient attention to 
salient and unexpected stimuli. The ventral network is right lateralized and includes the 
temporo-parietal junction and ventral frontal cortex, whereas the dorsal network includes the 
frontal eye fields, intraparietal sulcus and superior parietal lobe (see Chica, Bartolomeo & 
Lupianez, 2013; Petersen & Posner, 2012). 
Eye movement behaviors can provide important information about goal-directed and 
stimulus-driven selection processes because they allow measurement of endogenous and 
exogenous saccades.  An individual will execute endogenous saccades towards stimuli that 
are required for and relevant to the ongoing task, whereas stimuli that capture attention 
irrespective of the observer’s goals and expectations will elicit exogenous saccades (Godijn 
& Theeuwes, 2002). In a situation where a target and distractor appear simultaneously, for 
example, goal-directed processes are required to voluntarily inhibit an exogenous saccade to 
the distractor, thereby increasing the time taken to initiate an endogenous saccade to the 
target (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002).  
Theoretical Frameworks of Selective Attention to Threat in Anxiety 
A number of accounts suggest that anxiety is characterized by vigilance for threat, 
where individuals with high levels of anxiety rapidly orient towards and allocate attentional 
resources to threatening stimuli in their environment, thus facilitating attentional processing 
in these regions (Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). These 
accounts propose that vigilance for threat occurs in high trait anxious individuals, especially 
when concurrently experiencing high levels of state anxiety.  For example, Mogg and 
Bradley (1998) proposed that there are two systems involved in anxiety-related stimulus 
processing: the valence evaluation system (VES) and the goal engagement system (GES). 
The affective valence of a stimulus is assessed automatically by the VES. If the output of this 
evaluation process indicates threat is present, then the function of the GES is to automatically 
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allocate resources to the stimulus and assess current goals. The GES will continue to allocate 
resources to current goals if a low threat value has been assigned to the stimulus. Mogg and 
Bradley (1998) proposed that high levels of trait anxiety are associated with a lowered 
threshold in the VES for labeling a stimulus as threatening, leading to a bias in the stimulus 
evaluation process. Consequently, the GES directs attentional resources towards threat 
stimuli more frequently in individuals with high (vs. low) levels of trait anxiety. The 
framework suggests that, for all individuals, the VES correctly evaluates and labels stimuli as 
threatening when they have an objectively high threat value. In contrast, biases towards 
threats of an objectively mild threat value will be evident in individuals with elevated trait 
anxiety. Mogg and Bradley (1998) further proposed a pattern of vigilance-avoidance in 
anxiety, where the initial allocation of attention to threat is followed by avoidance (attention 
is directed away from threat at later stages of processing to regulate feelings of negative 
affect). This pattern of vigilance-avoidance is suggested to maintain anxiety, as it increases 
initial attention to threat and precludes habituation to these stimuli.  
The proposed mechanism underlying vigilance for threat differs across theories of 
anxiety and attention. Mogg and Bradley (1998) suggested that vigilance for threat occurs as 
a consequence of a lowered threshold for evaluating an ambiguous (or mild threat) stimulus 
as threatening. In contrast, Williams et al., (1997) place less emphasis on the stimulus 
evaluation process and instead suggest that high and low anxious individuals differ in their 
allocation of attention in the presence of all threatening stimuli (mild or high threat); they 
proposed that individuals with high levels of anxiety direct attention towards threat and 
individuals with low levels of anxiety direct attention away from threat. More recently, it has 
been proposed that impairments in attentional control underlie vigilance for threat in anxiety 
and, additionally, lead to difficulties disengaging attention from threat and difficulties 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
9 
 
Running Head: ANXIETY, SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND HYPERVIGILANCE 
inhibiting processing of threatening distractors (Attentional Control Theory; Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  
Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007) suggests that rapid orienting 
of attention to threat (e.g., vigilance) occurs as a result of an increased influence of the 
stimulus-driven attentional system in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety. This theory 
also proposes that trait anxiety is associated with a decreased influence of the goal-directed 
attentional system, leading to impairments in functions related to attentional control such as 
inhibition (e.g. resisting distractor interference), attentional shifting (moving between 
multiple tasks) and updating information in working memory. These impairments are 
suggested to be particularly pronounced in the presence of threatening distractors because 
individuals with high levels of anxiety are unable to inhibit processing of task-irrelevant 
threat, leading to a loss of attentional focus and impaired performance on task-relevant 
activities. The notion of impaired attentional control and difficulties inhibiting threat 
processing are consistent with attention maintenance theory (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002), which suggests that increased state and/or trait anxiety is 
characterized by slower attentional disengagement from threat (vs. non-threat) stimuli. This 
theory proposes that the threat bias occurs due to increased dwell time on threat stimuli (i.e., 
difficulties inhibiting and shifting attention away from threat), rather than rapid initial 
orienting towards threat.  
Empirical Evidence for Selective Attention to Threat in Anxiety 
 The following sections review the empirical evidence separately for the two proposed 
components of the selective attentional bias to threat: vigilance and attention maintenance. 
Each section begins with a review of the traditional RT paradigms that have been widely used 
to consider selective attention to threat. We then outline the ways in which eye tracking 
techniques have further explicated these attentional processes. The findings are presented 
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across samples with different clinical anxiety disorders and in subclinical samples with high 
levels of self-reported anxiety; this approach is based on research suggesting that these 
groups do not differ in the magnitude of the threat bias. Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, and van IJzendoorn (2007) conducted a meta-analysis based on 
three paradigms linked to selective attention (the dot probe, spatial cueing and Stroop 
paradigm) and found that there was a significant bias towards threat in individuals with 
anxiety, regardless of their clinical status  (clinical or subclinical) or type of clinical anxiety 
disorder (generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, social phobia, simple phobia).  
 Vigilance. Vigilance for threat has predominantly been assessed using the dot probe 
paradigm. This paradigm involves the presentation of stimulus pairs consisting of an 
emotional stimulus (threat or positive) and a neutral stimulus. The stimulus pair is replaced 
by a dot probe that appears in the location of the previous neutral or emotional stimulus and 
participants are asked to respond to the probe (i.e., to indicate its location or identity). If an 
individual selectively orients their attention towards the threat item in a threat-neutral 
stimulus pair, then RTs will be faster when the dot probe appears in the same location as the 
threat (vs. the neutral) stimulus (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986).  
Using this paradigm, findings of vigilance for threat stimuli have been demonstrated 
in individuals with high trait anxiety (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998), high state 
anxiety (Mogg, Bradley, DeBono, & Painter, 1997), a clinical diagnosis of generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD) (MacLeod et al., 1986), a clinical diagnosis of social phobia (Mogg, 
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004) and high fear of spiders (Mogg & Bradley, 2006). These findings 
are reliably observed when the stimulus pairs are presented for a short duration (e.g., up to 
500 ms; (Bradley et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Mogg et al., 1997; Mogg et al., 2004), 
but are less reliable when the stimulus pairs are presented for longer durations (e.g., over 
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1250 ms; (Bradley et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Mogg et al., 2004). Despite 
indications that the selective attentional bias to threat occurs at a relatively early stage of 
processing, it has been highlighted that the RT dot probe paradigm can only be used to assess 
the attentional bias to threat at the snapshot of time in which the probe occurs (Yiend, 2010). 
It is possible that multiple attentional shifts can occur within 500 ms of stimulus presentation, 
however the RT dot probe paradigm cannot elucidate whether attention was allocated to the 
threatening stimulus before or after the onset of the probe (Yiend, 2010). Eye movement 
measures have proved useful in addressing this limitation because they provide an online 
measure of orienting responses from the onset until the offset of threat-neutral stimulus pairs 
(i.e., prior to the probe) in this paradigm. 
 Eye tracking studies have also reported findings consistent with vigilance for threat in 
anxiety (see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). A number of studies have measured eye 
movements concurrently whilst participants completed a typical RT dot probe paradigm. 
These studies measured eye movements continuously from the onset of the threat-neutral 
stimulus pair until the manual response. A bias in initial orienting to threat stimuli is inferred 
from a higher proportion of first fixations or initial saccades landing on a threat (vs. non-
threat) stimulus, and shorter latencies between the onset of a display and the first fixation on 
a threat (vs. non-threat) stimulus. These studies indicate that, in comparison with non-anxious 
control participants, there is a bias in initial orienting to: angry faces in individuals with GAD 
(Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000) and social phobia (Stevens, Rist, & Gerlach, 2011); angry 
and fearful faces in individuals with high trait anxiety (Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007); 
negative faces (angry and sad) in individuals with high social anxiety (Bradley, Mogg, & 
Millar, 2000); and angry and happy faces in individuals with high fear of negative evaluation 
when experiencing current social-evaluative stress (i.e., where participants anticipated that 
they would need to deliver a speech following the experiment; see Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 
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2006). The broad conclusion drawn from these studies is that there is an attentional bias in 
initial orienting to threat in anxiety, supporting the proposition that anxious individuals 
selectively attend to threat.  
Similar findings have been reported in eye tracking studies using free-viewing tasks. 
These studies have typically involved the simultaneous presentation of two or four emotional 
or neutral pictures for 2 -60 seconds and participants are simply asked to look at the pictures 
in whichever way they choose. Eye movements are measured continuously from the onset 
until the offset of the images, providing an online measure of attention over a longer 
timescale compared with the dot probe paradigm
1
. An initial bias in orienting responses is 
inferred from a higher probability of first fixations, or a higher proportion of total fixations or 
total viewing time directed towards a threat (vs. neutral) stimulus within the first 500 ms or 
1000 ms of stimulus presentation. Using these paradigms, a bias in initial orienting has been 
observed for angry and happy faces in individuals with a heightened fear of negative 
evaluation (Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Muhlberger, 2009) or social phobia (Gamble & 
Rapee, 2010); positive and threatening pictures in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety 
(Calvo & Avero, 2005); spider pictures in spider fearful individuals (Rinck & Becker, 2006); 
and contamination threat pictures for individuals with high contamination fear (Armstrong, 
Sarawgi, & Olatunji, 2012).  
It is possible that positive findings of vigilance for threat rely on the specific 
experimental conditions that occur in the dot probe and free viewing paradigms, such that 
results reflect a preference to allocate attention to threat when presented with simple visual 
                                                 
1
 The longer stimulus durations in free-viewing tasks have typically been used to consider the theoretical 
proposition that anxiety is characterized by initial vigilance towards threat, followed by attentional avoidance 
(Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Attentional avoidance is recognized to be a strategy actively employed at later stages 
of cognitive processing (e.g., from approximately 500 ms onwards after stimulus onset; e.g., Hofmann, Ellard, 
& Siegle, 2012) that works to regulate negative affect (Cisler & Koster, 2010). While we include theories and 
research that incorporate the notion of attentional avoidance, this concept is not central to our discussion of 
anxiety and attention. Therefore, we focus our discussion only on the initial orienting responses in free-viewing 
tasks.  
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displays in which there are few items and it is predictable that no more than one of these 
items will be threatening. The evolutionary purpose of selective attention is, however, to 
ensure that the limited capacity cognitive system selects high priority signals for further 
processing from a large array of competing environmental stimuli (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 
2003). A selective attentional mechanism is of limited value if it only operates in simple 
visual environments, where few items compete for attentional resources. If selective attention 
to threat is a fundamental attribute in anxious individuals, then it should also be evident in 
complex visual environments that include numerous stimuli in a variety of locations. This 
proposition can be assessed with eye movement measures by considering whether individuals 
with high levels of anxiety are able to direct their initial orienting response (e.g., the first 
fixation) to a threatening stimulus rather than the numerous competing stimuli that appear in 
complex visual displays.   
Consistent with this proposition, Armstrong and Olatunji (2012) found that 
individuals with higher levels of anxiety fixated threatening targets more rapidly compared 
with non-anxious individuals in visual search studies with display sizes ranging from 7 to 20 
items. Crucially, this orienting bias to threat in anxious individuals was not evident on the 
earliest eye movement indicators, such as the location of the first fixation in a trial. In other 
words, anxious and non-anxious individuals did not differ in the frequency with which the 
first fixation landed on a threat target. Armstrong and Olatunji (2012) suggested that the 
absence of an initial orienting bias in the visual search (vs. dot probe and free viewing) 
studies might be explained by the increased perceptual load (e.g. more display items) and 
greater stimulus eccentricity associated with this paradigm, indicating that the orienting bias 
in anxiety may be capacity-limited.  
A recent eye tracking study using an alternative complex experimental task also found 
no evidence of an initial orienting bias to threat in anxiety. Huijding, Mayer, Koster, & Muris 
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(2011) recruited individuals with high or low fear of spiders and employed a change detection 
paradigm in which participants were presented with pictures of household scenes for 10 
seconds. Participants were informed that no target stimulus, one target stimulus or two target 
stimuli could appear slowly in the image and that they should press a button when they 
noticed a change in the image. Eye movements were measured concurrently. The target 
stimuli were neutral (a crossed knife and fork), negative (a skull with cross bones) or spider-
relevant (a spider). The results indicated that manual detection responses did not differ 
between a high and low spider fearful group for any type of target stimulus. However, when 
considering the time taken and number of non-target fixations between the onset of the first 
target and the first target fixation, they found that individuals with a high (vs. low) fear of 
spiders took significantly longer to fixate a spider target and made more non-target fixations. 
This effect was not observed if the first target was neutral or negative. This finding is 
compatible with threat avoidance, but inconsistent with rapid initial orienting of overt 
attention to threat.  
To summarize, a consistent and replicable literature has emerged using the dot probe 
and free viewing paradigms which supports the proposition that individuals with high levels 
of anxiety are vigilant by rapidly allocating attention to threatening stimuli. The 
generalizability of these findings has been challenged by the mixed results reported from 
studies using more complex experimental paradigms. If vigilance for threat in anxiety is 
closely tied to the experimental conditions in the dot-probe or free-viewing paradigms, then it 
is possible that this effect is specific to situations in which there are few competing visual 
stimuli and where prior learning indicates that there is a high probability that one threat 
stimulus will appear in a small number of pre-determined locations.  The literature has not yet 
established whether findings of vigilance for threat generalize to experimental conditions that 
more closely resemble real-world situations; for example, conditions in which there are a 
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large array of competing visual stimuli, where the appearance of a threat stimulus is 
unexpected and where the number, location and timing of threat stimuli is unpredictable.  
Attention maintenance. The spatial cueing paradigm has been used as a method for 
distinguishing between rapid engagement with threat (e.g., vigilance) and delayed 
disengagement from threat (e.g., attention maintenance). It involves the presentation of a 
threatening, positive or neutral peripheral cue, which is either congruent (valid cue) or 
incongruent (invalid cue) with the location of a subsequent target. The participant is asked to 
respond to the target (i.e., indicate its identity or location). The rationale underlying the 
paradigm is that valid cues should facilitate performance (i.e., leading to faster RTs in 
response to the target) and invalid cues should disrupt performance (i.e., leading to slower 
RTs in response to the target; see Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). It has been argued that 
rapid engagement with threat stimuli would be reflected in faster RTs to the target following 
valid threat (vs. valid non-threat) cues. Conversely, delayed disengagement from threat would 
be reflected in slower RTs to the target following invalid threat (vs. invalid non-threat) cues 
(see Fox et al., 2001, 2002). 
There is growing evidence from the spatial cueing paradigm to show that individuals 
with high levels of anxiety are slow to disengage attention from threat. Findings of delayed 
disengagement have been observed for angry faces in individuals with high levels of state 
anxiety (Fox, et al. 2001), social threat words in individuals with social phobia (Amir, Elias, 
Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003) and emotional (angry and happy) faces in individuals with 
high levels of trait anxiety (Fox, et al. 2002). Furthermore, there is evidence to indicate that 
difficulties disengaging from threat are especially pronounced in individuals reporting high 
levels of trait anxiety in conjunction with low levels of attentional control (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002). These studies did not provide any evidence to support the proposition of rapid 
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engagement with threat in individuals high in state or trait anxiety or individuals with social 
phobia.  
Koster and colleagues (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Koster, 
Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005) similarly proposed that performance on the dot 
probe task could result from either rapid engagement with threat (when a probe appeared in 
the location of the threat stimulus), or slowed disengagement from threat (when the probe 
appeared in the opposite location to the threat stimulus). To distinguish between these 
explanations, they modified the paradigm by measuring RTs in trials containing neutral-
neutral stimulus pairs and comparing these to RTs in trials containing threat-neutral stimulus 
pairs. They argued that rapid engagement with threat would be reflected in faster RTs when 
the probe replaced the threat stimulus in the threat-neutral condition compared with when the 
probe replaced a neutral stimulus in the neutral-neutral condition. In contrast, slowed 
disengagement from threat would be reflected in slower RTs when the probe replaced the 
neutral stimulus in the threat-neutral condition compared with the neutral-neutral condition. 
Using this rationale, Koster et al. (2006) found results consistent with delayed disengagement 
from threat in high trait anxious individuals, but no evidence of rapid engagement with threat.  
A number of eye movement studies have addressed a similar research question. 
However, rather than presenting threatening stimuli as task-relevant cues that predict the 
location of a target, these studies have extended the spatial cueing and dot probe paradigms 
by presenting threatening stimuli as distractors that are spatially distinct from a target 
stimulus. These methods distinguish between attentional capture by task-irrelevant threat 
(vigilance) and delayed disengagement from task-irrelevant threat (attention maintenance).  
Here, the concept of attentional capture is very similar to rapid engagement; however the 
critical distinction is that attentional capture is regarded as an impairment because it relates to 
the negative impact of task-irrelevant threat, whereas rapid engagement is typically 
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considered in relation to facilitated attention. Thus, while RT findings from the spatial cueing 
paradigm indicate that anxiety does not affect engagement with a task-relevant cue, it remains 
possible that anxiety is associated with attentional capture by task-irrelevant distractors.  
Initial studies in this area used complex displays with 8 to 16 stimuli and measured 
eye movements concurrently during an RT visual search task (Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, 
Trippe, & Weiss, 2004; Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005).  The emphasis 
was on assessing the detrimental impact of threat (vs. non-threat) distractors on target 
detection. Miltner et al. (2004), for example, presented participants with displays containing 
either one target (a spider or mushroom) amongst 15 flower distractors or one target and one 
singleton distractor (a spider target and mushroom distractor or vice versa) amongst 14 
flower distractors. Participants were instructed to make a key press response when they 
detected a pre-specified target. The results showed that participants with a spider phobia 
executed eye movements towards singleton spider distractors and singleton mushroom 
distractors before looking at a target on 30.2% and 10.8% of the trials respectively (12.2% 
and 14.1% respectively for non-phobic control participants). They also reported that 
responses to detect a mushroom target were slower in participants with a spider phobia (vs. 
control participants) when a singleton spider distractor was present in the display. These 
findings suggest that feared distractors captured overt attention and interfered with ongoing 
performance (as indexed by manual detection responses) in anxious individuals.  
In a related visual search study, Rinck et al. (2005) found that spider fearful 
individuals fixated on spider distractors for a longer duration and were slower to detect a 
target presented amongst spider distractors compared with non-fearful individuals. In 
contrast, there was no significant difference in gaze duration or the time taken to detect the 
target between the fearful and non-fearful groups when the distractors were butterflies or 
beetles. The authors concluded that individuals with high levels of anxiety were slower to 
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disengage their attention from feared objects. However, these findings were not replicated in 
a visual search study by Derakshan and Koster (2010), where eye movement measures 
indicated that trait anxiety was not associated with delays in disengaging visual attention 
from threatening distractors (angry faces). 
To summarize, studies that have used RT paradigms to disentangle the vigilance and 
attention maintenance hypotheses have frequently found evidence to support the latter with 
consistent findings of delayed disengagement from threat. However, eye tracking studies that 
have focused more specifically on the detrimental impact of threatening distractors have been 
equivocal in this respect, but have provided some evidence to suggest that anxiety is 
associated with two distinct forms of impaired attention: attentional capture by threat (Miltner 
et al., 2004) and delayed disengagement of foveal vision from threat (Rinck et al., 2005).  
Hypervigilance and Threat Detection in Anxiety 
We argue that a significant limitation in the existing literature on anxiety is the 
assumption that selective attention to threat is closely linked to hypervigilance and enhanced 
threat detection. While selective attentional processes are associated with the orienting 
network, hypervigilance is more readily linked to the alerting network proposed by Posner 
and colleagues (Fan et al., 2005; Posner, 2012; Posner & Rothbart, 2007). Hypervigilance 
serves to ensure that the cognitive system is alert and in a state of readiness to detect high 
priority signals that have the potential to threaten survival (Beck & Clark, 1997; Dolan & 
Vuilleumier, 2003). Posner and Peterson (1990) suggested that the alerting network makes it 
possible to respond to high priority stimuli by sustaining activation in the cognitive system 
over extended periods of time (i.e., hypervigilance) or in response to warning signals (i.e., 
phasic alertness). Diffuse brain regions have been associated with this alerting network, 
including the locus coeruleus and the right frontal and parietal cortex (Fan et al., 2005; 
Posner, 2012; Posner & Peterson, 1990; Posner & Rothbart, 2007).   
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While several cognitive theories highlight hypervigilance and rapid detection of threat 
as important components of anxiety (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005; Eysenck, 1992; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), the model proposed by Eysenck (1992) is the only theoretical 
account to make differential predictions about the relationship between anxiety and attention 
before and after threat detection. Consistent with other theoretical frameworks, Eysenck 
(1992) proposed that high trait anxious individuals selectively narrow attention onto 
threatening (vs. neutral) stimuli following threat detection. Prior to detection, Eysenck (1992) 
suggested that individuals with high levels of trait anxiety are hypervigilant
2
 for threat in 
order to enhance threat detection, leading to (1) rapid scanning of the environment for threat 
with a narrow focus of attention and numerous eye movements or (2) the maintenance of a 
broad focus of attention until a threatening stimulus is encountered. This theoretical model 
raises the possibility that atypical attentional processes are not restricted to situations in 
which a threat is present, but can occur pervasively before and after threat detection. For 
example, ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) suggests that impairments in attentional control occur in 
the presence and absence of threat and that in its absence anxious individuals remain 
hypervigilant for threat, leading to increased distraction from task-irrelevant stimuli and 
reduced attentional focus on ongoing tasks. These impairments in attentional control occur 
because cognitive capacity is dedicated to scanning the environment for threat rather than 
carrying out task-relevant activities (Beck et al., 2005).  
The following section reviews empirical evidence consistent with enhanced threat 
detection in anxiety based on RT measures from the visual search paradigm. We then 
highlight the utility of eye movement studies in assessing the proposition that anxiety is 
                                                 
2
 Beck et al. (2005) also discussed hypervigilance; they proposed that it reflects cognitive mobilization in 
response to the possibility of threat and impending danger that prepares an individual for a defensive reaction. 
Similarly, in their model of social phobia Rapee and Heimberg (1997) suggested that, after detecting an 
audience, individuals with social phobia are hypervigilant for signs of negative evaluation (e.g. frowns), anger 
and aggression.  
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characterized by hypervigilance for threat, leading to enhanced threat detection and increased 
distraction from task-irrelevant stimuli across the visual field.   
Empirical Evidence for Superior Threat Detection in Anxiety 
The majority of the literature surrounding threat detection in anxiety has utilized the 
visual search paradigm (Bar-Haim, et al. 2007; review by Donnelly, Hadwin, Menneer, & 
Richards, 2010). In the visual search paradigm, participants are asked to search for and 
indicate the presence or absence of a target that is presented with different numbers of 
distractor stimuli to make displays of different set sizes. Visual search studies typically 
measure RTs to detect the target as a function of set size and calculate the gradient of the 
search slope (where RTs are regressed against set size).  Search slopes can be used to 
consider search efficiency, where shallow slopes represent an efficient search and indicate 
that set size has no impact (or a small impact) on the speed of detecting the target (Duncan & 
Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 1998). Inefficient search is reflected in a steep search slope 
gradient, where the speed of detecting the target item decreases as set size increases. It has 
been suggested that anxiety might moderate a number of parameters involved in searching for 
and deciding upon the presence of a threat (e.g., information processing rates and decision 
thresholds; see Donnelly et al., 2010). These effects would lead to faster RTs and shallower 
slopes when searching for threat (vs. non threat) in individuals with high (vs. low) levels of 
anxiety.  
Studies employing RT measures have found that search for and detection of 
evolutionary threats (e.g. snakes and spiders) is enhanced in individuals reporting high levels 
of fear or phobia for specific stimuli (Flykt & Caldara, 2006; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; 
Rinck et al., 2005; Soares, Esteves, Lundqvist, & Öhman, 2009). There is also evidence to 
suggest that social anxiety and trait anxiety are associated with greater speed and accuracy in 
searching for and detecting the presence of angry target faces (Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & 
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Amir, 1999; Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005). Further 
studies have varied set size in order to assess the effect of anxiety on search efficiency as 
indexed by the gradient and intercept of the search slope (Eastwood et al., 2005; Matsumoto, 
2010). These studies found that anxiety was linked to greater efficiency in detecting the 
presence of an angry face in high (vs. low) trait anxious adults (Matsumoto, 2010) and adults 
with social phobia and panic disorder compared with control participants or individuals with 
OCD (Eastwood et al., 2005). 
Matsumoto (2010), for example, asked participants to indicate the presence or 
absence of a discrepant face in displays containing 4, 8 or 12 schematic faces. Target absent 
displays contained faces of the same expression (angry, happy or neutral) and target present 
displays contained one angry or one happy target presented amongst emotional or neutral 
distractors. They found that the gradient of the search slope was significantly shallower for 
angry target faces compared with happy target faces in high (but not low) trait anxious 
individuals in the context of neutral distractors.  
In isolation, within-group effects of this type do not necessarily imply that anxious 
individuals use the threatening content of the target to guide search. Some researchers have 
argued that this finding indicates that anxious individuals are sensitive to feature differences 
between angry and happy faces (e.g., the angle of the eyebrows or mouth; see Cave & Batty, 
2006) and it raises the possibility that anxiety would be associated with similar sensitivities to 
feature differences for any visual stimuli, even those that are unrelated to threat. It is also 
difficult to determine whether the within-group effect in anxious individuals is driven by a 
heightened ability to use visual features associated with angry faces, a reduced ability to use 
visual features associated with happy faces, or both.   
Matsumoto (2010) also found that the search slope for the angry faces was shallower 
in the high trait anxious group compared with the low trait anxious group. Between- group 
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effects of this type are important in indicating that an individual’s level of anxiety specifically 
affects search for threat. The typical explanation for this effect is that anxious individuals are 
more able to use the threatening content of a stimulus to guide search. An alternative 
explanation is that anxious individuals are more able to use features associated with threat to 
guide search due to increased motivation or practice in finding threatening stimuli (Cave & 
Batty, 2006). 
Taken together, the results of visual search studies typically suggest that there is 
enhanced threat detection in anxiety. These findings are relatively consistent across clinical 
and sub-clinical populations experiencing different types of anxiety (e.g. spider phobia, social 
anxiety, trait anxiety, GAD; see also Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009). However, the 
mechanisms that underlie this facilitated performance remain unclear. In particular, few 
studies have explored the hypervigilance hypothesis (e.g., Eysenck, 1992); that anxiety is 
associated either with a broad distribution of attention or with rapid scanning of the 
environment with a narrow focus of attention. 
Hypervigilance: Attentional Broadening and Excessive Scanning. 
Few eye tracking studies have been conducted to assess the hypothesis that anxiety is 
characterized by hypervigilance, where individuals either excessively scan the visual 
environment for threat with numerous eye movements or maintain a broad focus of attention 
by executing few eye movements (Freeman, Garety, & Phillips, 2000; Horley, Williams, 
Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2004). Horley et al. (2004) found evidence of excessive scanning in 
individuals with social phobia in a free-viewing task, where participants were presented with 
a picture of a neutral, sad, angry or happy face for 10,000 ms. They found that the scanpath 
length (the total distance covered by the eyes) was greater for individuals with social phobia 
(vs. controls) when viewing angry or neutral faces. They concluded that this finding reflected 
hypervigilance for signs of negative social evaluation in individuals with social phobia. In 
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contrast, Freeman et al. (2000) found no evidence of excessive scanning or enhanced threat 
detection in a group of individuals with GAD. Taken together, the findings from these studies 
are equivocal with respect to the hypothesis that anxious individuals excessively scan the 
environment for threat (Eysenck, 1992).  
One further eye tracking study considered the possibility that anxiety is associated 
with enhanced threat detection and it aimed to assess whether this occurred in the context of a 
broad focus of attention or excessive scanning (Richards, Hadwin, Benson, Wenger, & 
Donnelly, 2011). Using a redundant signals paradigm, Richards et al. (2011) instructed 
participants to indicate the presence or absence of a target face (angry or happy) with a 
keypress response and eye movements were measured concurrently. Displays contained two 
items: two neutral faces in the target absent condition; one emotional target (angry or happy) 
and one neutral face in the single target condition; two emotional targets (either two angry or 
two happy faces) in the redundant target condition. Presentation of only one target was 
required for a target present response. The results showed that trait anxiety was linked to 
increased processing capacity to detect multiple (vs. single) angry faces. Individuals with 
higher levels of trait anxiety also executed fewer eye movements regardless of the presence, 
absence or expression of the target. Richards et al. (2011) concluded that anxiety affects the 
efficiency of the threat detection system such that it is possible for anxious individuals to 
more readily accumulate threatening information from multiple locations across the visual 
field, thereby improving threat detection in the presence of multiple (vs. single) threats. 
Furthermore, they suggested that the tendency for anxious individuals to maintain a broad 
focus of attention by executing fewer eye movements is likely to facilitate this detection 
process.  
Taken together, evidence to support the notion that hypervigilance involves excessive 
scanning (i.e. numerous eye movements) in anxiety is equivocal (e.g., Freeman et al., 2000; 
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Horley et al., 2004). However, some evidence does support the proposition that individuals 
with elevated anxiety adopt a broad distribution of attention and demonstrate increased 
processing capacity to detect multiple threats within this attended region (Richards et al., 
2011).   
Monitoring the environment for threat facilitates threat detection; however, it also 
requires cognitive capacity (Beck et al., 2005) and, therefore, leads to increased distraction 
from task-irrelevant stimuli and reduced attentional focus on ongoing tasks (i.e. impaired 
attentional control; Eysenck et al., 2007).  Recent eye tracking research has aimed to 
understand the processes underlying impaired attentional control in anxiety by using 
modified versions of traditional eye tracking tasks such as the oculomotor capture paradigm 
(Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2008), anti-saccade paradigm (Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, 
Shoker, & Eysenck, 2009; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012; Wieser, Pauli, & Muhlberger, 2009) 
and remote distractor paradigm (Richards, Benson, & Hadwin, 2012). We suggest that 
findings from these studies are consistent with the impairments in attention predicted by the 
hypervigilance hypothesis.  
The oculomotor capture, antisaccade and remote distractor paradigms involve the 
participant suppressing an exogenous saccade to a task-irrelevant stimulus (threat or non-
threat) and voluntarily executing an endogenous saccade to a target stimulus or location. If 
anxiety is associated with attentional capture by threat, then anxious individuals should be 
unable to suppress exogenous saccades to task-irrelevant threat. If individuals with high 
levels of anxiety find it difficult to disengage overt attention from threat, then anxiety should 
be associated with a delay in voluntarily executing endogenous saccades away from task-
irrelevant threat presented within foveal vision. If anxiety is characterized by a broad focus of 
attention, then the delay in voluntarily executing endogenous saccades towards a target 
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should occur irrespective of whether the task-irrelevant threat is presented within or outside 
foveal vision.  
In a typical oculomotor capture task (e.g., Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, & Irwin, 1998), 
participants are presented with displays containing approximately six grey circles in 
peripheral locations. On every trial, all but one of the circles changes color from grey to red. 
Participants are required to execute an eye movement towards the color singleton and provide 
a manual response to discriminate the letter presented inside the color singleton. On some of 
the trials, an additional red circle (a task-irrelevant abrupt onset) appears simultaneously with 
the color change. Theeuwes et al. (1998) found that exogenous saccades were made to task-
irrelevant abrupt onsets prior to the endogenous saccade towards the target on 30-40% of the 
trials. They concluded that attention was involuntarily captured by the abrupt onset stimuli.   
Gerdes et al. (2008) modified the oculomotor capture paradigm by manipulating the 
picture presented inside the abrupt onset such that it contained either no picture or a picture of 
a spider, mushroom or flower. They found that the percentage of error fixations (i.e., first 
fixations on the abrupt onset due to an inability to suppress an exogenous saccade) was 
significantly higher in a group with a clinically significant spider phobia compared with a 
control group, but this effect was not threat-specific and occurred regardless of whether the 
abrupt onset contained a picture of a spider, mushroom or flower or contained no picture. The 
duration of error fixations on an abrupt onset containing a spider picture was significantly 
longer in the spider phobic group compared with the control group (i.e., indicating a delay in 
executing an endogenous saccade away from threat) and this effect was not observed for 
abrupt onsets containing other stimuli. Gerdes et al. (2008) suggested that this pattern of eye 
movement behavior was indicative of “unspecific hypervigilance” followed by a “specific 
disengagement deficit” (p. 184). That is, attention was captured by all types of abrupt onset in 
individuals with spider phobia because it was possible that any of these stimuli could contain 
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a spider. In contrast, delays in disengaging attention from the abrupt onset were specific to 
threatening stimuli in individuals with spider phobia.  
Similar findings of non-specific hypervigilance and threat-specific difficulties in 
inhibition have been observed using the anti-saccade paradigm (Derakshan et al., 2009; 
Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012; Wieser, Pauli, & Muhlberger, 2009). Here, participants are 
presented with a peripheral visual cue, which they are asked to look towards (prosaccade 
condition) or away from (antisaccade condition) as quickly as possible. The antisaccade 
condition requires the inhibition of an exogenous prosaccade to the cue and volitional 
programming of an endogenous antisaccade to the mirror position. Accurate first saccade 
latencies are typically slower in the antisaccade (vs. prosaccade) condition. This paradigm 
has been modified by presenting peripheral cues that are either threatening or non-threatening 
(e.g., Derakshan et al., 2009; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012; Wieser, Pauli, & Muhlberger, 
2009). In the antisaccade condition, attentional capture by threat is reflected in a higher 
proportion of exogenous saccades to a threatening (vs. non-threatening) cue and impaired 
inhibition of threat is reflected in longer antisaccade latencies (endogenous saccades) when 
the peripheral cue is threatening (vs. non-threatening).  
Using this rationale, Derakshan et al. (2009) presented face cues (angry, happy or 
neutral) in peripheral locations and found that the latency of the accurate first saccades in the 
antisaccade condition were significantly longer in a high (vs. low) trait anxious group when 
the cue was an angry (but not happy or neutral) face. Anxiety did not affect the error rate in 
the antisaccade condition (as indexed by exogenous saccades to the cue). These findings 
indicate that there was a delay in inhibiting processing of threat stimuli in anxious 
individuals, but provide no evidence for attentional capture by threat. This finding was 
replicated by Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2012). In contrast, Wieser, Pauli, and Muhlberger 
(2009) found that anxiety did not affect the latency of the first saccade in the antisaccade 
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condition; however, individuals high in fear of negative evaluation made significantly more 
errors in the antisaccade condition compared with control participants for all facial 
expressions (angry, happy, fearful, sad and neutral). They concluded that there was a general 
attentional control deficit in anxiety. These studies provide some evidence to indicate that the 
impairment in attentional control is associated with a specific difficulty in inhibiting threat 
processing even if threat stimuli are presented outside foveal vision (Derakshan et al., 2009; 
Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012), or that anxiety is associated with non-specific hypervigilance 
(Wieser, Pauli, & Muhlberger, 2009).  
The remote distractor paradigm requires participants to execute a saccade to a target 
as quickly as possible and to ignore the presence of a simultaneously presented distractor that 
occurs for the majority of the trials (Benson, 2008; Walker, Deubel, Schneider, & Findlay, 
1997). Walker et al. (1997) found that the presence of a distractor (a circle) delayed the 
latency of the endogenous saccade to a target (a cross) by 30-40 ms when the distractor was 
centrally located and by 10-30 ms when the distractor was presented in the contralateral 
visual hemifield to the target (compared with trials in which no distractor was present). 
Furthermore, exogenous saccades to a distractor typically occur in approximately 10-30% of 
the trials in this paradigm (Benson, 2008). This paradigm has been modified to distinguish 
between the different components of impaired attentional control in anxiety by presenting 
threat (vs. non-threat) distractors in central, parafoveal or peripheral locations (Richards et 
al., 2012). Here, attentional capture by threat is reflected in a higher proportion of inaccurate 
exogenous saccades to threat (vs. non-threat) distractors. Delayed disengagement from threat 
is reflected in a greater delay in executing endogenous saccades to the target in the presence 
of a central threat (vs. non-threat) distractor. A more pervasive difficulty in inhibiting threat 
across the visual field is reflected in a greater delay in executing endogenous saccades to the 
target in the presence of central, parafoveal and peripheral threat (vs. non-threat) distractors. 
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Richards et al. (2012) instructed participants to look at a target (a square or a 
diamond), presented in a parafoveal or peripheral location, as quickly and accurately as 
possible and to indicate its identity with a keypress response. The target was either presented 
alone or with a task-irrelevant distractor face (angry, happy or neutral). The results showed 
no evidence of attentional capture by threat; anxiety was not associated with an inability to 
suppress exogenous saccades to angry distractors. However, trait anxiety was positively 
associated with the magnitude of the delay in executing endogenous saccades to the target in 
the presence of angry (but not happy or neutral) distractors, and this effect was consistent 
when the angry face was presented in central, parafoveal or peripheral locations. Richards et 
al. (2012) concluded that the findings indicated both impaired attentional control and 
hypervigilance for threat in anxiety; individuals with increased trait anxiety were able to 
extract threatening information from a broad attentional beam and this led to greater 
interference from task-irrelevant threat presented in a variety of locations across the visual 
field. This study demonstrated that the tendency to remain hypervigilant for threat across the 
visual field disrupts attentional control and leads to pervasive difficulties in focusing attention 
on current tasks (Beck et al., 2005; Eysenck et al., 2007). 
To summarize, findings from these studies are consistent with impairments in 
attentional control predicted by the hypervigilance hypothesis (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 
2007), indicating that anxious individuals monitor the environment for threat and are unable 
to suppress interference from threatening distractors.  While eye tracking studies do not 
support the notion of specific attentional capture by threat in anxiety (Derakshan et al., 2009; 
Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012; Richards et al., 2012), the evidence suggests that there may be 
non-specific hypervigilance in anxiety as reflected in increased attentional capture by task-
irrelevant threat and non-threat stimuli (Gerdes et al., 2008; Wieser, Pauli, & Muhlberger, 
2009). The findings also indicate that there is a delay in executing endogenous saccades to a 
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target in the presence of task-irrelevant threat in anxious individuals (Derakshan et al., 2009; 
Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012; Richards et al., 2012) where this impaired inhibition occurs for 
threats presented across a broad region of the visual field (Richards et al., 2012).  
Theoretical Implications 
Recent studies using eye movement methods have provided new insight into the 
threat-related attentional bias in anxiety. Collectively, these studies have started to explore 
the typical features of eye movement behavior in anxious individuals in order to assess the 
characteristics of the attentional bias under different experimental conditions. We suggest that 
previous findings and future studies of eye movement behavior could be used to test and 
distinguish between different theoretical models of anxiety and attention. Although 
attentional biases to threat in anxiety have typically been regarded as covert attentional 
processes, our emphasis on overt visual orienting is based on the view that a dissociation 
between covert and overt attention is unlikely to occur when an individual is presented with a 
complex visual scene that places demands on both the capacity of the cognitive system and 
the physiological constraints of the visual system. 
Recent reviews (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Weierich, Treat, and Hollingworth, 
2008) have also highlighted the potential utility of eye tracking measures in understanding 
attentional processing in anxiety and, in particular, have suggested that these measures can be 
used to distinguish between two key components of the selective attentional bias: vigilance 
(i.e., initial orienting to threat) and attention maintenance (i.e., difficulties disengaging from 
threat). However, we argue that eye movement measures can also be used to address broader 
theoretical hypotheses that extend beyond the notion of selective attention to threat. In 
particular, we suggest that these measures can also be used to consider the hypothesis that 
anxiety is characterized by hypervigilance for threat.  
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Based on our review of the empirical research across different paradigms and 
measurement techniques, we present a framework (Figure 1) that regards selective attention 
and hypervigilance for threat as separable processes which can be distinguished by their 
evolutionary purpose, their underlying mechanisms, the environmental or experimental 
conditions in which they occur, the patterns of facilitated and impaired attention that they 
generate, and the predicted pattern of associated eye movement behaviors. Our proposition 
that selective attention to threat and hypervigilance for threat are separable is supported by 
recent evidence suggesting that these processes can be distinguished by their neural circuitry 
and the type of anxiety that they elicit. In line with previous theories of anxiety and attention, 
the framework we present reflects threat processing in individuals with high levels of trait 
anxiety or clinical levels of anxiety, especially when concurrently experiencing high levels of 
state anxiety. We regard anxiety as a dimensional construct in which high levels of trait 
anxiety are a risk factor in the development of anxiety disorder (see also Eysenck, 1992); 
therefore, we argue that the framework is also relevant to understanding threat processing in 
individuals with different forms of clinical anxiety disorder. However, given the small 
number of studies considering hypervigilance for threat in anxiety (e.g., attentional 
broadening, excessive scanning and impaired inhibition), we note that an important direction 
for future research will be to consider the extent to which hypervigilance varies as a function 
of clinical status and type of clinical anxiety disorder.  
 Figure 1 highlights that hypervigilance for threat and selective attention to threat 
serve distinct purposes. The purpose of hypervigilance is to remain in a state of readiness for 
the possible occurrence of threat in order to ensure that it is detected rapidly (e.g., Eysenck, 
1992). Selective attention to threat ensures that threat stimuli receive processing priority at 
the expense of non-threat stimuli (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997).  Both 
processes are adaptive evolutionary functions that serve to protect individuals from 
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impending or present danger. However, these processes become maladaptive in anxious 
individuals because they are excessively sensitive to threat (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997).  
The mechanisms that underlie hypervigilance and selective attention are directly 
opposed and, therefore, are unlikely to occur simultaneously (see Figure 1). Hypervigilance 
would be accomplished either by broadening attention or by rapidly scanning the 
environment with a narrow focus of attention (Eysenck, 1992); both approaches would make 
it possible to monitor a large region of the environment for threat. In contrast, selective 
attention would be accomplished by narrowing attention onto threat stimuli (e.g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). This approach would ensure that a small region of the 
environment received processing priority such that there was detailed processing of threat 
stimuli and minimal processing of non-threat stimuli. We propose that the process of 
monitoring for threat (via attentional broadening or excessive scanning) and the process of 
narrowing attention onto a threatening stimulus would be associated with increased activation 
in dissociable regions of the brain and would elicit different types of anxiety. Specifically, 
selective attention to threatening stimuli would elicit transient anxiety and be associated with 
increased activation in the amygdala; hypervigilance for threat would elicit sustained anxiety 
and be linked to increased activation in the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (Somerville et 
al., 2013; Somerville, Whalen, & Kelley, 2010). 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that subcortical structures (e.g., pathways 
between the amygdala and thalamus) are important components of the neural circuitry 
involved in the early processing of threatening stimuli (Davis & Whalen, 2001; LeDoux, 
1998) and that a heightened amygdala response is likely to underlie selective attention to 
threat in anxiety (Hofmann, et al. 2012).  Findings related to heightened amygdala activation 
during threat processing in anxious individuals may occur as a result of the frequent use of 
experimental paradigms that present transient stimuli for a short duration of time (e.g., the 
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appearance of a threatening face or threatening word for less than 1000 ms). It has been 
argued that stimuli of this type will elicit transient anxiety, which occurs for a brief duration 
in response to a discrete threat stimulus (Somerville et al., 2013, 2010). Transient anxiety 
most clearly resembles state anxiety and, therefore, it is likely that the interaction between 
high trait anxiety and high state anxiety that is proposed in theoretical models of anxiety will 
be particularly evident in studies that assess selective attention to threat using transient threat 
stimuli.    
Somerville and colleagues have recently drawn an important distinction between 
transient anxiety and sustained (or anticipatory) anxiety and found that the latter is not 
associated with heightened activation in the amygdala. Sustained anxiety is elicited in 
situations where an individual monitors for and anticipates threat (e.g., hypervigilance), 
particularly under conditions where the timing of this threat is unpredictable (Somerville et 
al., 2013, 2010). The tendency to persistently monitor for threat over a long duration is likely 
to be closely related to trait anxiety. The impact of state anxiety may be less evident over 
these longer timescales.  Brain regions that have consistently been linked to sustained anxiety 
and threat monitoring are the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) and the insula. The 
BNST (also known as the ‘extended amygdala’) is located in the ventral basal forebrain 
(VBF) and shares many similarities with the amygdala including its composition and 
common projections to the brainstem and hypothalamus (Somerville et al., 2010).  
Despite these similarities, it has been suggested that there is a functional dissociation 
between these structures, where the amygdala responds transiently to immediate threat cues, 
and the BNST responds to situations that require sustained monitoring for threat over a longer 
period of time (Somerville et al., 2010, 2013). There is also evidence to indicate that 
individuals with high levels of trait anxiety or spider phobia show increased activation in the 
VBF/BNST and insula in experimental conditions that involve monitoring for or anticipating 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
33 
 
Running Head: ANXIETY, SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND HYPERVIGILANCE 
threat (Somerville et al., 2010; Straube, Mentzel, & Miltner, 2007). These findings are 
consistent with theoretical frameworks proposing that anxiety is associated with 
hypervigilance for threat.    
Figure 1 indicates that the expected patterns of facilitated and impaired attention 
depend on the nature of the bias (hypervigilance or selective attention) and the experimental 
or environmental conditions (e.g., the presence or absence of threat and the task-relevant or 
task-irrelevant nature of a threat). The patterns of facilitated and impaired attention that 
would occur in anxiety due to selective attention to threat can be understood in terms of the 
orienting network. Orienting involves disengaging attention from the current location, 
shifting to and engaging attention at a new location (Posner & Petersen, 1990). Therefore, 
delayed disengagement of attention from task-irrelevant threat would be one of the 
components of impaired attention in anxiety (e.g., Fox et al., 2001, 2002). There would also 
be rapid engagement with threat in anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Williams et al., 1997) and, depending on the experimental conditions or environmental 
demands, this process could lead to either facilitated or impaired attention. Specifically, rapid 
engagement with threat would lead to facilitated attention if the threat was task-relevant or 
appeared in the same spatial location as a target. Impaired attention would be manifest in the 
case of rapid engagement with a task-irrelevant threat (i.e., attentional capture).   
The proposed pattern of facilitated and impaired attention associated with selective 
attention to threat would only be relevant in situations where a threat was present in the 
environment. In contrast, the pattern of facilitated and impaired attention associated with 
hypervigilance would be relevant in the presence and absence of threat. In the absence of 
threat, hypervigilance would lead to difficulties focusing attention on an on-going task 
because attentional resources would be dedicated to monitoring a large region of the 
environment for threat (Beck et al., 2005; Eysenck et al., 2007). Similar difficulties in 
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focusing attention on an ongoing task would occur, possibly to a greater extent, in the 
presence of task-irrelevant threat (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). In this situation, 
individuals with high levels of anxiety would detect and be unable to inhibit processing of 
task-irrelevant threat located anywhere within the monitored region.  Facilitated attention 
would occur in the presence of a task-relevant threat; here, hypervigilance would allow 
individuals with high levels of anxiety to rapidly detect threat stimuli.  
Figure 1 outlines predictions about the eye movement behaviors that would occur in 
the context of hypervigilance and selective attention to threat. Hypervigilance could be 
accomplished via two strategies: individuals with high levels of anxiety may excessively scan 
the environment with numerous eye movements or they might execute few eye movements 
(i.e., use peripheral vision) in order to maintain a broad distribution of attention (see Eysenck, 
1992). Both strategies allow visual sampling of a wide region of the visual field. Rapid 
scanning would involve a narrow spotlight of overt attention moving across the visual field 
such that a large number of stimuli received short periods of foveal processing. In contrast, a 
broad distribution of attention would involve executing few eye movements and maintaining 
longer periods of visual fixation whilst covertly processing stimuli using peripheral vision.  
These strategies would facilitate threat detection but also lead to difficulties focusing 
attention on an on-going task; the latter would be demonstrated by delays in executing 
endogenous saccades to task-relevant neutral stimuli in both the presence (regardless of 
location) and absence of threat.  
In contrast, selective attention to threat would be accomplished via overt visual 
orienting; foveal vision would be directed towards threatening stimuli such that they could be 
inspected in greater detail using the area of highest visual acuity. Selective attention would be 
evident in fast and accurate saccades towards task-relevant threat or task-relevant locations 
that contain threat (i.e. rapid engagement). In the case of task-irrelevant threat, selective 
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attention might be reflected in the delayed execution of endogenous saccades away from 
foveal threat (i.e., delayed disengagement) or an inability to suppress exogenous saccades 
towards threat (i.e., attentional capture).  
Based on this framework, we suggest that the results of studies measuring eye 
movement behavior are not readily compatible with the premise that anxiety is characterized 
by a pervasive selective attentional bias to threat. In particular, there is inconsistent evidence 
for rapid engagement or delayed disengagement of overt attention (e.g., foveal vision) from 
threat.  Findings of rapid engagement with threat have typically been observed in free-
viewing tasks or RT tasks with concurrent eye movement measures, which include simple 
visual displays containing two or four items (e.g., Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2007; 
Mogg et al., 2000; Stevens et al., 2011). These findings have not typically been replicated in 
studies using more complex visual displays (e.g., Derakshan & Koster, 2010; Huijding et al., 
2011). Furthermore, some eye tracking evidence suggests that there is capture of overt 
attention by task-irrelevant threat in anxiety (Miltner et al., 2004); however, more recent 
studies have questioned this finding by using traditional eye tracking paradigms to show that 
anxious individuals are able to suppress exogenous saccades to threat stimuli (Derakshan et 
al., 2009; Richards et al., 2012). Findings of delayed disengagement from threatening 
distractors in eye tracking studies could be related to selective attention to threat (Rinck et al., 
2005). However, further work demonstrates that delays in executing endogenous saccades to 
a target object or location are not limited to threats presented within foveal vision but also 
occur for threats presented in parafoveal and peripheral locations (Derakshan et al., 2009; 
Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012; Richards et al., 2012).  
We propose that the results of studies measuring eye movements demonstrate a 
pattern of facilitated and impaired attention that is consistent with hypervigilance for threat in 
individuals with high levels of anxiety.  Collectively, the findings suggest that executing few 
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eye movements and maintaining a broad focus of attention allows individuals with high 
levels of anxiety to accumulate and efficiently detect threatening information from multiple 
locations (Richards et al., 2011), but also leads to increased distractibility from task-irrelevant 
threats presented in a variety of locations across the visual field (e.g., as indexed by delayed 
endogenous saccades to a target; Derakshan et al., 2009; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012; 
Richards et al., 2012). Following Eysenck (1992), a further feature that may be relevant to the 
idea of excessive scanning or distractibility within a broad attentional beam is the finding of 
“unspecific hypervigilance” reported by Gerdes et al. (2008) and replicated by Wieser, Pauli, 
and Muhlberger (2009); here, anxious individuals were unable to suppress exogenous 
saccades to both threat and non-threat stimuli, which may reflect a tendency to monitor new 
visual stimuli in order to ensure that they are not threatening. 
Therefore, we propose that hypervigilance is a key characteristic of attentional 
processing in individuals with high levels of anxiety, which is readily distinguishable from 
selective attention to threat. Hypervigilance for threat has been included in a number of the 
theoretical frameworks of anxiety and attention (e.g., Beck et al., 2005; Eysenck 1992; 
Eysenck et al., 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), yet it has generated very little research 
interest in comparison with the literature relating to selective attention to threat. Although 
there is some evidence consistent with the selective attention pathway (e.g. findings from free 
viewing paradigms and dot probe paradigms with concurrent eye movement measures), these 
effects seem to occur in a restricted set of experimental conditions. Therefore, we suggest that 
future work should aim to understand and test the parameters of hypervigilance and selective 
attention in anxious individuals using a variety of experimental paradigms and, as outlined in 
the framework, eye movement measures may provide an effective tool for characterizing 
these components of the attentional bias. 
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Clinical Implications 
Research on attentional biases has, in recent years, had a direct impact on the 
development of novel interventions for elevated anxiety and anxiety disorder. The rationale 
for developing these interventions stems from findings which indicate that Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy (CBT), the treatment of choice for anxiety disorders, is effective in 
reducing anxiety symptoms for at least 50% of those who are treated but, crucially, it is not 
effective for all individuals (Olatunji, Cisler, & Deacon, 2010).  Therefore, there is a clear 
need to identify further interventions that are efficacious for individuals with an anxiety 
disorder and especially those who do not respond to CBT.  For researchers considering 
attentional biases, there has been increasing impetus to translate findings of selective 
attention to threat in anxiety to a clinical or therapeutic setting by developing Attention 
Training Techniques (ATTs). ATTs aim to reduce anxiety by using experimental tasks (most 
frequently a modified version of the dot probe paradigm) that train individuals with high 
levels of anxiety to shift their attention away from threatening stimuli and towards neutral 
stimuli.  
An example of an ATT protocol based on a modified version of the dot probe 
paradigm was developed by Amir and colleagues (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; 
Amir, Beard, Taylor, Klumpp, Elias, & Burns, 2009). This ATT involved trials in which a 
threat-neutral or neutral-neutral stimulus pair was followed by a probe stimulus that the 
participant had to identify (an E or an F). The threat-neutral stimulus pairs were presented for 
the majority of the trials (66-80% of trials) and the probe always replaced the neutral 
stimulus, thus creating conditions that encouraged participants to direct attention away from 
threat. The threatening stimuli were either words (Amir, Beard, Burns et al., 2009) or disgust 
faces (Amir, Beard, Taylor et al., 2009). The results indicated that the ATT (vs. a placebo 
control condition) led to reductions in the threat-related attentional bias and reductions in 
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self-reported and clinician-reported anxiety in individuals with GAD (Amir, Beard, Burns et 
al., 2009) and generalized social phobia (GSP; Amir, Beard, Taylor et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, a significantly higher proportion of participants no longer met diagnostic 
criteria for GAD or GSP following the ATT compared with the placebo control condition.  
ATTs based on the dot probe paradigm are designed to target selective attention to 
threat; the extent to which these techniques are effective in modifying the selective 
attentional bias are typically assessed by comparing performance on the original (non-
training) dot probe paradigm before and after the intervention period. However, the use of the 
dot probe paradigm as an outcome measure often obscures the extent to which reductions in 
the selective attentional bias following the ATT are due to changes in vigilance or changes in 
attention maintenance on threat.  In order to distinguish between these possibilities, Amir, 
Beard, Taylor et al. (2009) used the spatial cueing paradigm as an outcome measure; this task 
involved neutral words or social threat words being used as cues (valid or invalid) to the 
location of a subsequent target. The results indicated that individuals in the ATT group (but 
not the placebo control group) were faster to disengage attention from threat following the 
intervention period (compared with pre-intervention). Furthermore, the ATT led to greater 
reductions in clinician-reported social anxiety for those individuals who showed greater 
improvements in the ability to disengage from threat. In contrast, there was no evidence to 
suggest that the ATT (vs. placebo control) led to slower engagement with threat following the 
intervention period (compared with pre-intervention). Thus, the ATT had a positive effect on 
the attention maintenance, as opposed to the vigilance, component of the selective attentional 
bias.  
Research indicates that exposure to ATTs successfully modifies attentional biases to 
threat and reduces trait anxiety, state anxiety and clinical symptoms in individuals with social 
anxiety disorder and GAD (Bar-Haim, 2010; Cowart & Ollendick, 2010). Despite these 
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positive findings, ATTs are not effective in all individuals with anxiety (see Bar-Haim, 
2010). Furthermore, a mixed pattern of results was reported in a recent meta analysis that 
considered the efficacy of cognitive bias modification in reducing anxiety and depression 
(Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). In this meta-analysis, cognitive bias modification incorporated 
studies utilizing ATTs to modify the attentional bias to threat or interventions that aimed to 
reduce interpretation biases (i.e. reduce the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
threatening). Hallion and Ruscio (2011) found that the interventions reliably led to reductions 
in attentional and interpretation biases; however, this effect was significantly smaller for 
ATTs (small effect size) compared with interventions that aimed to modify the interpretation 
bias. Furthermore, they found that the effect size for the reduction in anxiety following 
cognitive bias modification was small.  
On an individual basis, the efficacy of ATTs is likely to be explained by individual 
differences in attention to threat prior to treatment. Bar-Haim (2010) highlighted that a 
selective attentional bias is not observed in all anxious individuals and research has indicated 
that the reductions in anxiety following an ATT are only observed in individuals who show a 
selective attentional bias to threat prior to treatment (Amir, Taylor, & Donoghue, 2011).   
Our proposal that hypervigilance is a key component of attentional processing raises 
the possibility of developing and improving the efficacy of ATTs. Existing ATTs aim to 
modify selective attentional processes, but they are not designed to modify any atypical 
attentional processes that occur prior to or during threat detection (e.g., hypervigilance and 
attentional broadening). There may be benefits associated with ATTs that promote focused 
attention and reduce the tendency to monitor for threats across a broad region of the visual 
field, thus minimizing interference from task-irrelevant threats and gradually reducing the 
sensitivity of the threat detection mechanism.  Rather than specifically training individuals to 
direct attention away from threatening stimuli, this training would be designed to improve 
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attentional focusing on relevant stimuli and on-going tasks in both the presence and absence 
of threat.  
The training program developed by Bomyea and Amir (2011) is an example of a 
protocol that may be useful in reducing hypervigilance for threat in anxious individuals. 
Bomyea and Amir (2011) aimed to reduce the frequency of thought intrusions in young 
adults by training inhibitory control; this training involved a working memory task which 
either required high inhibitory control (experimental group) or low inhibitory control (control 
group). Following training, the participants completed a thought suppression task in which 
they were asked to recollect a negative personal memory and then, over a short period (15 
minutes), they were asked to indicate every time they experienced a thought related to that 
memory. The results indicated that the high inhibitory control group experienced significantly 
fewer thought intrusions compared with the low inhibitory control group; that is, the 
inhibitory control training was associated with a greater ability to inhibit intrusive thoughts. 
Although this study was conducted with healthy adults, Bomyea and Amir (2011) highlighted 
that a difficulty inhibiting intrusive thoughts is a common feature of anxiety and depression. 
Furthermore, they highlighted the potential utility of this type of domain-general inhibitory 
control training in addressing the impairments in executive functioning and attentional 
control that occur in individuals with anxiety and depression. This paper fits within a broader 
set of studies that have considered the impact of improving attentional control via working 
memory training, where preliminary findings have highlighted positive change on attentional 
control and decreases in self-report anxiety symptoms (e.g., Roughan & Hadwin, 2011).  
Extending this research, we suggest that domain-general attentional control training 
may also be effective in reducing hypervigilance for threat in individuals with elevated 
anxiety. This training could be used to promote focused attention, suppress the tendency to 
monitor the environment for threatening stimuli and reduce interference from task-irrelevant 
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threat.  Therefore, we suggest that the efficacy of ATTs could be enhanced by implementing 
a more comprehensive intervention protocol, which applies different attention modification 
techniques (e.g. threat bias training or domain-general attentional control training) to the 
components of attentional processing that occur under different environmental conditions. By 
developing a range of ATTs it also becomes possible to assess attentional biases prior to 
treatment (e.g., to establish whether an individual shows hypervigilance, selective attention or 
both) and to tailor the treatment protocol on an individual basis such that it targets the 
appropriate components of attentional processing.  
Conclusions 
To conclude, recent studies using eye movement methodology are consistent with the 
proposal that anxious individuals show hypervigilance for threat via a broad focus of 
attention, where this process leads to facilitated threat detection, increased distractibility and 
fewer eye movements being executed in the presence of threat. It remains possible that 
selective attention to threat, and its associated patterns of facilitated and impaired attention, 
also occurs in anxiety as a separate attentional process; although evidence from eye 
movement research does not consistently support this proposition. Empirical evidence from 
studies using eye movement measurements most clearly support theoretical frameworks 
where anxiety is characterized by hypervigilance and enhanced threat detection (Eysenck, 
1992) and impaired attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007).  
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Figure 1: A conceptual framework for understanding attentional pathways for individuals 
with high levels of trait anxiety that operate differentially across experimental conditions and 
that reflect eye movement behavior indicating (1) selective attention to threat (right hand 
pathway) and (2) hypervigilance for threat (left hand pathway).
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Highlights  
 We highlight selective attention and hypervigilance as distinct biases in anxiety.  
 We present a novel framework for understanding eye movement behavior in anxiety.  
 We outline the application of this framework to clinical intervention.  
